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chapter 9
On the ‘Edge’ of Good Neighbourliness in eu Law: 
Lessons from Cyprus
Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou
1 Introduction
Article 8 of the Treaty of the European Union (teu) sets out a duty for the 
Union to develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries based 
inter alia on the good neighbourliness principle, on the values of the Union 
and characterised by close and peaceful cooperation.1 This is proposed to be 
achieved through the conclusion of ‘specific agreements with the countries 
concerned’, possibly based on reciprocity of rights and obligations and/or 
joined activities.2 As evidenced by the various contributions in the present vol-
ume, many questions spring to mind when reading this new provision, regard-
ing its raison d’être, its scope and its implications within the framework of the 
eu Treaties3 and the wider good neighbourliness principle deriving from inter-
national law.4 The role of Member States vis-à-vis the Union’s neighbours has 
been outlined in this volume in various contexts, and the Member States’ own 
1 Article 8(1) Treaty on European Union [2010] oj C 83/1 (teu).
2 Article 8(2) teu.
3 With respect in particular to Articles 2, 3(5) and 21(1) teu and Part V Treaty on the Functioning 
on the European Union [2010] oj C 83/1 (tfeu). For a legal appraisal of Article 8 teu in eu 
law, see Peter Van Elsuwege and Roman Petrov, ‘Article 8 teu: towards a new generation of 
agreements with the neighbouring countries of the eu?’ (2011) 36(5) el Rev 688–703; see also 
Dominik Hanf, ‘The enp in the light of the new “neighbourhood clause” (Article 8 teu)’ in 
Erwan Lannon (eds), The European Neighbourhood Policy’s Challenges (P.I.E. Peter Lang, 
Brussels 2012) 109–126. For a consideration of the export of eu norms post-Lisbon through 
Articles 3(5), 21 and 8(1) teu (the latter providing an ‘eu neighbourhood competence’), see 
Christophe Hillion, ‘Anatomy of eu norm export towards the neighbourhood’ in Roman 
Petrov and Peter Van Elsuwege (eds), Legislative approximation and application of eu law in 
the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union. Towards a common regulatory space? 
(Routledge, Abingdon 2014) 13–20.
4 For a very detailed and up-to-date account of the principle of good neighbourliness in the 
wider framework of international law and applied to the eu, see Elena Basheska, ‘The Good 
Neighbourliness Principle in eu Law’ (PhD Thesis, University of Groningen, 2014).
* Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of Central Lancashire, Cyprus.
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commitment towards good neighbourliness within the eu.5 As rightly pointed 
out by another contributor to this volume in the context of the eu enlarge-
ment policy, ‘[d]epending upon the involvement of eu Member States and the 
risks for the importation of regional disputes into the eu’s internal structures, 
the requirement of good neighbourliness is either translated into an obligation 
of conduct or an obligation of result’,6 thereby revealing the changing or flexi-
ble nature of good neighbourliness. To determine the scope of good neigh-
bourliness in the eu legal order, as enshrined in particular in Article 8 teu, and 
delimit any underlying commitment on the part of Member States, there is 
arguably a need to examine the ‘micro’ or individual relations a Member State 
maintains with its own neighbours. Such a micro-analysis of essentially bilat-
eral relations should also permit reflections on the question of reciprocity and 
‘sharing of values’ underlying good neighbourliness in a given relationship or 
set of relations.7 In this context, Cyprus is believed to be a unique case study, 
arguably standing both geographically and substantively at the ‘edge’ of good 
neighbourliness and as such, outlining the flexible nature of good neighbourli-
ness through its atypical or ‘outer’ application in eu law.8 The micro-analysis 
in the case of Cyprus would focus on the ‘de facto neighbouring’ relations the 
Republic of Cyprus maintains with the part of its own sovereign territory under 
Turkish military control (internal relations) and, as a result, on the rather 
uneasy relations Cyprus maintains with Turkey as its neighbour, at the Union’s 
door-step and also as a candidate country currently undergoing the accession 
negotiation process (external relations).
This chapter therefore proposes to deepen our understanding of the good 
neighbourliness principle in eu law, as enshrined in Article 8 teu and within 
5 Ibid, Chapter 2.
6 Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘Good Neighbourliness as a Condition for Accession to the European 
Union: Finding the Balance between Law and Politics’ in this volume.
7 For a discussion of the values promoted by good neighbourliness in eu law and their rela-
tionship with ‘fundamental values essential to international relations’, see Basheska (n 4) 
85–86. For an application of ‘shared values’ in eu enlargement and/or in enp, see Paivi Leino 
and Roman Petrov, ‘Between “common values” and competing universals – the promotion of 
the eu’s common values through the enp’ (2009) 15(5) elj 654–671; see also Marise Cremona 
and Christophe Hillion, ‘L’Union fait la force? Potential and limitations of the enp as an 
integrated eu Foreign and Security Policy’, eui Working Papers, law No 2006/39, 3–5, 18–22. 
For a detailed and recent consideration of the process of Europeanisation in the eu’s Eastern 
Neighbourhood, including Ukraine and Russia, see generally Petrov and Van Elsuwege (n 3). 
For a delimitation and analysis of the role of eu core values in this process, see Dimitry 
Kochenov, ‘The issue of values’ in same volume.
8 See also Basheska (n 4) 145.
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the overall fabric of the eu Treaties, from the perspective of the Member States – 
more specifically of a single one, Cyprus – in an attempt to identify some of the 
outer limits of good neighbourliness. This will be done through a review of the 
scope of Article 8 teu, including from the perspective of a single Member 
State (2), followed by an analysis of the outward application of good neigh-
bourliness in the context of Cyprus ‘from within’ the eu (3) and finally ‘from 
outside’ the eu, also from the lens of reciprocity and shared values arguably 
lying at the core of good neighbourliness (4). The lessons to be learnt from 
Cyprus will relate to the scope of good neighbourliness in the eu legal order 
and to the specific forms it may take when considering the troubled relations 
of a single Member State with its ‘neighbours’. Good neighbourliness may be 
more ‘demanding’ on a specific Member State in a situation internal to the eu, 
but there may be counterparts in this case. This chapter will also assess the 
extent to which uneasy bilateral relations between a Member State and a third 
country can be efficiently addressed through eu external relations, the form 
this good neighbourliness will take and the legal and political implications it 
may have on other eu Member States, the third country concerned and the 
values of the Union.
2 The Scope of Article 8 teu from the Perspective of Member States: 
From Collective to Individual Considerations
Article 8 teu is not expressly addressed to Member States, even though it is 
they who are primarily and directly concerned by this provision. Like the eu, 
Member States have neighbours. Unlike the eu, these can be located within or 
outside the eu (the eu only has external borders; hence external neighbours). 
The mere fact that a specific Treaty provision is not expressly addressed to the 
Member States does not mean that such a provision does not extend ‘by anal-
ogy’ to them and/or create obligations on them,9 especially when Union inter-
ests are at stake. In view in particular of the duties of sincere cooperation and 
9 In Cases C–46/93 and C–48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany and R v Secretary of State 
for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ecr I–1029, paras 28–29, where the 
ecj, instead of relying mainly on Article 4(3) teu and the principle of effectiveness of eu 
law, linked Member State liability to the principle of non-contractual liability of the eu insti-
tutions enshrined in Article 340(2) tfeu, on the basis that the justification for such liability 
was to be found in the ‘general principles common to the laws of the Member States’, namely 
the obligation to make good damage caused by an unlawful act or omission, including by 
public authorities in the performance of their duties; see Paul P Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, 
eu Law, Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn oup, ny 2011) 244.
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of solidarity of the eu legal order,10 it would appear quite peculiar to argue that 
the eu alone is under an obligation to develop special relationships with 
neighbouring countries by virtue of Article 8 teu, while Member States are not 
required to do so within the framework of the eu Treaties.11 A question thus 
arises as to the extent and the conditions, if any, under which Member States 
are bound under Article 8 teu or otherwise, to develop good relations with 
their own neighbours and the implications of any such obligation within the 
framework of the eu Treaties.12
As a preliminary step, the term ‘neighbour’ within the framework of Article 
8 teu would need to be considered and delimited in eu law, with respect not 
only to its external aspect but also arguably to its internal aspect and from a 
10 The eu has been traditionally regarded as a regional grouping designed to promote secu-
rity and stability. As was argued more recently by Williams, peace between the eu 
Member States has now become a question of ‘democratic peace’ – Andrew Williams, The 
Ethos of Europe: values, law and justice in the eu (cup, Cambridge 2010) 22–69, ‘based on 
reasonable interests of states and promoted through the law as a main resource for solv-
ing disputes between them’; see Basheska (n 4) 46; see also Dimitry Kochenov and Fabian 
Amternbrink, ‘The Active Paradigm of the Study of the eu’s Place in the World: An 
Introduction’, in Dimitry Kochenov and Fabian Amtenbrink (eds), The eu’s shaping of the 
international legal order (cup 2014, Cambridge) 1–18, 4, 5. It appears that the role of peace 
in the eu has changed to the extent that ‘for long as democracy is maintained within the 
Union’s membership the legal structures will operate effectively to remove any questions 
of territorial or economic tensions that was previously endemic in the European theatre’; 
see Williams, ibid 64. As a result, good neighbourliness in the eu appears to be based on 
the principles of sincere cooperation and solidarity rather than on territorial integrity as in 
public international law, thereby calling into question the salience of national borders; 
see Basheska (n 4) 46.
11 It is generally observed that the principle of national sovereignty in external affairs has 
been increasingly subject to the duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) teu, espe-
cially post Lisbon. For a review of the scope of the duty of sincere cooperation in eu 
external relations, see e.g. Eleftheria Neframi, ‘The duty of loyalty: rethinking its scope 
through its application in the field of eu external relations’ (2010) 47(2) cml Rev 323; see 
also Steven Blockmans and Ramses Wessel (eds), ‘Principles and practices of eu external 
representation’, cleer Working Papers 2012/5. It is also recognised that Member State 
national interests are transcended through the principle of solidarity as embodied in vari-
ous eu Treaty provisions. For a review of the principle of solidarity within the context of 
good neighbourliness in the eu, see Basheska (n 4) 65–67.
12 The general duty of loyalty arising under Article 4(3) teu and incumbent on the Member 
States constitutes ‘an obligation to achieve a result to act in the Union interest […] ful-
filled through specific-result or best-effort obligations expressed through the duty of loyal 
cooperation’, an expression of the general duty of loyalty. The nature of the ‘specific obli-
gation’ will depend on the Union interest being promoted; see Neframi, ibid 324–325.
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multi-dimensional perspective.13 The situation of the Member States in par-
ticular would appear both interesting and challenging, as it is arguably based 
on relative and dynamic considerations. Depending on a Member State’s geo-
graphical location and size, its neighbours could themselves be located within 
the eu or outside the eu, at varying distances from the next Member State 
and/or neighbours, and in a nexus of interactive relationships. This situation 
is further complicated by the fact that neighbours can change, both within 
and outside the eu, including through a change to the internal structure of a 
neighbouring country or territory,14 with all the implications this may have on 
intra-state, inter-state and state-eu relations in the European periphery.15 The 
eu’s policies towards its neighbours also play an important role in shaping 
the European neighbourhood and this is arguably the case for the European 
neighbourhood ‘at large’.16 eu enlargement, for instance, not only ultimately 
13 See Hillion in Petrov and Van Elsuwege (n 3) 16.
14 In view in particular of conflicts in the European region involving territory/border dis-
putes among eu Member States, prospective eu States and/or third countries, as devel-
oped in this volume. See also Joint Communication by the European Commission and 
High Representative of the eu for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘A new response to 
a changing Neighbourhood’, COM(2011) 303 final, 12; Steven Blockmans and Ramses 
Wessel, ‘The eu and peaceful settlement of disputes in its neighbourhood: the emergence 
of a new regional security actor?’ in Antonis Antoniadis et al., The eu and global emergen-
cies: law and policy aspects (Hart, Oxford 2011). Neighbouring countries could actually also 
be neighbouring territories with a certain degree of autonomy. For an analysis of the dis-
pute over the Isthmus of Gibraltar between Spain and the uk as the only example of 
non-self-governing territory within the meaning of Article 73 un Charter located in 
Europe, see Artur Khachaturyan, ‘Applying the Principle of Good of Neighbourliness in 
eu Law: The Case of Gibraltar’ in this volume. For a list of border disputes between ‘two 
internationally recognised sovereign States with an adjoining territorial or maritime bor-
der’ involving eu Member States, see the House of Commons Hansard Written Answers, 
13 January 2005, pt 17 available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/
cmhansrd/vo050113/text/50113w17.htm> last accessed 15 December 2014. Issues or claims 
of territorial sovereignty within existing eu Member States would by definition fall within 
the Member State’s own internal affairs. For an overall view of all border disputes involv-
ing Member States and their relative importance in the context of eu boundary gover-
nance, see Basheska (n 4) 73–76. For the legal implications of a State secession scenario 
within an eu Member State, see Phoebus Athanassiou and Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, ‘eu 
accession from within? An introduction’ (2014) 33(1) yb el 1.
15 See Andrew Cottey, ‘Regionalism and the eu’s neighbourhood policy: the limits of the 
possible’ (2012) 12(3) Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 375–391.
16 Pertti Joenniemi, ‘Turning into a sovereign actor? Probing the eu through the lens of 
neighbourhood’ (2012) 17 Geopolitics 25–46, 44.
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affects the eu’s external borders by reshaping them and pushing them out,17 
but it also gradually modifies the relationship between the eu, the existing 
Member States and/or the neighbouring countries meeting (or not) the 
requirements set out in Article 49 teu.18 Accordingly, due to and beyond 
the eu’s expanded borders, the eu is also developing interconnected ‘prox-
imity’ policies19 addressing the broad European perspective in a changing or 
dynamic neighbourhood.20 Such policies can take various forms,21 but all 
seem to promote prosperity and security in the region, including in the form 
17 See Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, The eu and Cyprus: principles and strategies of full integra-
tion (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2010) 51–58.
18 See Basheska (n 4) 71–72; see also Van Elsuwege in this volume.
19 In a sign that proximity policies are interconnected, it is worth mentioning that the 
Union’s relations with neighbouring countries (the European neighbouring policy in gen-
eral terms), especially prior to the creation of the specific European Neighbouring Policy 
covering a group of countries not including all eu neighbours (enp), were bilateral in 
nature (with some multilateral elements). They were used to establish an ‘entry-level’ 
playing field into the eu with possible upgrades, through association agreements for can-
didates or potential candidate countries (including Cyprus), as well as other Mediterranean 
countries signatories to the Barcelona Process, or through partnership and cooperation 
agreements with other countries (like Russia or Ukraine) with no or rather remote possi-
bilities for full eu membership; see Leino and Petrov (n 7) 659. That is why, following the 
2003 enlargement, the Commission initiated a new framework for relations with an 
‘immediate post-enlargement border with the eu’; ibid, 660; see also Cottey (n 15), 376–
378 and Van Elsuwege in this volume. Neighbouring relations however tend to develop 
more rapidly than legal frameworks. The very recent signing of the Association Agreement 
and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the eu and Ukraine on 27 June 
2014 appears to be a very clear illustration of the complex interconnection of the eu prox-
imity policies; see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/
en/ec/143478.pdf> last accessed 15 December 2014. In preparation for the signing of the 
Agreement, the Council had on 23 June 2014 ‘endorsed provisional application of parts of 
the agreement, since ratification by all 28 eu member states is a long process’, including 
the provisions on free trade; see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/143309.pdf> last accessed 15 December 2014.
20 See Joint Communication (n 14) 4–5; see also Steven Blockmans, ‘Friend or foe? Reviewing 
eu relations with its neighbours post Lisbon’ in Panos Koutrakos (ed), ‘The eu’s external 
relations a year after Lisbon’, cleer Working Papers 2011/3, 114.
21 Now primarily enshrined in the enp, the Union’s ‘umbrella’ policy towards its (immedi-
ate) neighbours gradually extended to a broad range of Eastern European and Southern 
Mediterranean States, but not including Russia; see Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the ep, ‘Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: a new framework for relations 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, COM(2003) 104; Communication from the 
Commission, ‘enp – Strategy Paper’, COM(2004) 373.
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of conditionality.22 The ‘neighbouring status’ within the framework of Article 
8 teu ought therefore to be examined in relative, dynamic and creative terms, 
as it appears to vary in time, space and also in substance and is not as such 
merely a descriptive or geographical label associated to a specific policy.23
All the above situations should entail prima facie the application of the 
good neighbourliness principle as enshrined in Article 8 teu, whether from an 
external perspective on eu neighbourhood relations by virtue of a rather 
‘asymmetrical’ application of the principle,24 or from an internal perspective 
through the alleged application of the neighbourhood clause to inter-State 
relations, on an equal basis. These scenarios and nexus of relations have been 
adequately covered elsewhere in this volume. A more speculative venture is to 
examine from this lens the relationship a single Member State maintains with 
its own neighbours, especially when such neighbours are in fact a country/
territory located geographically (or otherwise) outside of the eu. If Article 8 
teu appears to address expressly the eu’s external relations with its neigh-
bours and also the intra-eu neighbourhood relations, this provision does not 
seem a priori to be of immediate assistance when considering the individual 
relations a single Member State can maintain with a disputed territory or with 
a non-eu country. Given the fundamental nature of good neighbourliness in 
the eu,25 however, and notwithstanding the ramifications of the principles of 
22 Even if the enp does not apply a policy of conditionality but rather one of ‘joint owner-
ship’ of common values, the enp remains by definition a ‘unilateral eu policy’ and neigh-
bouring countries are formally requested to adhere to and promote the Union’s values as 
a result of their inclusion into the enp. This therefore also raises the question of the exis-
tence and scope of any obligation addressed to neighbouring countries under eu law; see 
Leino and Petrov (n 7) 660–663.
23 See e.g. Joenniemi (n 16) 28. Article 8 teu has been referred to as a ‘passe-partout’ clause 
applying to other countries than enp partners, such as Russia, the efta countries and 
the micro-states, on the basis in particular of the Declaration on Article 8 teu annexed to 
the Final Act of the igc which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon; see Van Elsuwege and Petrov 
(n 3) 692. For a narrower role attributed to Article 8 teu as a specific legal basis for the 
enp, see Blockmans (n 20) 115–116.
24 Van Elsuwege and Petrov (n 3) 694–695; see also Siniša Rodin, ‘The European Union and 
the Western Balkans: Does the Lisbon Treaty Matter?’ in Federiga Bindi and Irina 
Angelescu (eds), The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing the Europe’s Role in 
the World (2nd ed, Brookings Institution Press 2012) 153–171, 156.
25 If one considers in particular the location of Article 8 teu within the fabric of the eu 
Treaties under Title i teu and, as a result, its direct link with the Union’s universal values, 
objectives and fundamental principles, as well as the substantive nature of the provision 
in conjunction with the absence of procedural considerations in this Article. The exact 
nature and scope of the neighbourhood clause and the extent to which it can be used as 
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loyal cooperation and solidarity emphasising a priori the collective nature of 
Member State interests under eu law,26 it would seem unwise to conclude from 
this preliminary finding that the good neighbourliness principle as expressed 
in Article 8 teu is irrelevant to individual considerations of the neighbour-
hood relations a single Member State maintains with its neighbours.
Cyprus,27 provides a good illustration of the possible outer limits of good 
neighbourliness through the relations it maintains with the part of its territory 
over which its government does not exercise effective control, as well as with 
Turkey.28 Despite the fact that Cyprus joined the eu as one island in 2004, the 
territory of the Republic of Cyprus remains divided following the 1974 Turkish 
invasion,29 resulting in the application of eu law being suspended in the areas 
occupied by the Turkish troops, as they fall beyond the effective control of 
the government of the Republic of Cyprus.30 The question therefore relates 
to the nature of the legal regime applicable to this de facto situation, so as to 
identify the legal principles and values on which the relationship is founded 
and the potential role of good neighbourliness in this context. Cyprus’ direct 
relations with Turkey also raises legal challenges as far as the principle of good 
a new and/or autonomous legal basis is however debated; see Blockmans (n 20) 115–116; 
contra Hanf (n 4) 3–5, 7–8; see also Van Elsuwege and Petrov (n 3) 688, 691–692, 696–697 
and Basheska (n 4) 84–86.
26 Article 4(3) teu has been said to represent the interests of the Union and guarantee its 
autonomy, but it is first and foremost the ‘expression of the collective interest of the 
Member States’; Neframi (n 11) 324. Furthermore, whereas the national interests of 
Member States may not always coincide, the principle of solidarity vows to bring them 
closer.
27 Inter-state relations between Cyprus and its neighbours within the eu, such as Greece, 
fall outside the scope of this chapter since they are not ‘external’ by definition and are 
covered by Article 8 teu and/or more generally by good neighbourliness, as developed 
elsewhere in this volume. For the ‘bon voisinage’ relations between Greece and Turkey, 
including with respect to Cyprus, see e.g. Basheska (n 4) 128–138.
28 Geographically, Cyprus has other immediate neighbours located outside of the eu, none 
of which however holds the status of candidate country and therefore comparable to 
Turkey, also due to the context of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
29 The territory of the Republic of Cyprus is composed of the territory of Cyprus ‘minus’ the 
Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 
Cyprus. The territory of the Republic is itself split because that part of it is not controlled 
effectively by the government of the Republic; see e.g. Kypros Chrysostomides, The 
Republic of Cyprus. A study in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 2000).
30 See generally Laulhé Shaelou (n 17); see also Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, ‘Market Freedoms, 
eu fundamental rights and public order: views from Cyprus’ (2011) 30(1) yb el 298 and 
Nikos Skoutaris, The Cyprus issue (Hart, Oxford 2011).
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neighbourliness in eu law is concerned, as Turkey has proved to be a difficult 
partner, both in its bilateral relations with Cyprus within the framework of eu 
and international law, but also as a candidate country for eu membership.31 
This contribution proposes to give an overview of the relations Cyprus main-
tains with these two rather ‘unusual neighbours’, so as to examine to what 
extent these two instances of (internal/external) neighbouring relations may 
fall within the ambit of the neighbourhood clause and the legal implications of 
an alleged external application of good neighbourliness in this context.
The atypical or external application of the principle of good neighbourli-
ness in the context of Cyprus would entail an examination of the scope of such 
neighbouring relations rationae loci, materiae and personae, in a nexus of 
multi-dimensional relations.32 The primary interest for studying the external 
application of good neighbourliness from such a perspective lies in the consid-
eration of the extent to which and how eu law applies to Cyprus’ immediate 
‘neighbouring’ relations. This is so, given that the application of eu law is sus-
pended in the areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the government does 
not exercise effective control, even if these areas are located within the eu’s 
territory,33 whereas Turkey is a candidate country and as such, currently falls 
outside the eu’s territory. It is however inherent in the nature of the principle 
of good neighbourliness that this principle applies beyond the territory of the 
eu into the European neighbourhood, through conditionality policies in par-
ticular, hence the importance of studying its territorial, material and personal 
scope beyond the eu’s territory in this specific context of alleged external 
application.
Beyond immediate considerations related to the territorial scope of good 
neighbourliness in the context of Cyprus, the specific substance of the princi-
ple will be analysed to identify the material scope of good neighbourliness 
in the present context and establish what, in this instance, may constitute 
good neighbouring relations. Moreover, it will be necessary to determine the 
31 For a detailed account of the eu-Cyprus-Turkey triangular relationship over the years, see 
Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 59–70.
32 For the scope rationae materiae, personae and loci of eu law in the Member State territo-
ries, see generally Dimitry Kochenov (ed), eu Law of the Overseas: Outermost Regions, 
Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, Territories Sui Generis (Kluwer Law, The 
Hague 2011) and for Cyprus, see specifically Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, ‘The principle of 
territorial exclusion in the eu: Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus – a special case of sui 
generis territories in the eu’ (153–176) and Nikos Skoutaris, ‘The status of northern Cyprus 
under eu law: a comparative approach to the territorial suspension of the acquis’ (401–
416) in that volume.
33 See Preamble and Article 1(1) Protocol No 10 on Cyprus [2003] oj L 236/955.
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personal scope of application of the principle to establish the individual and/
or unilateral responsibility Cyprus can derive towards its ‘neighbours’, as well 
as any obligation that may arise towards the neighbouring territory/country 
itself. Of particular relevance to such considerations would be the question of 
the existence and scope of a minimum level or ‘threshold’ to be satisfied by 
all parties involved in neighbouring relations and of its legal origins. Within 
this framework, particular attention will be paid to establishing the legal 
nature of Cyprus’s ‘neighbouring’ relations within the realm of eu law, sup-
ported by international law so as to establish some possible outer limits for 
good neighbourliness.
3 The External Application of the Good Neighbourliness Principle 
‘from within’ the eu: The Case of the Occupied Areas in Cyprus
It is important to clarify from the outset that the case of the occupied areas in 
Cyprus is no ‘ordinary’ border or territory dispute involving a Member State 
and/or neighbouring countries/territories,34 since this territory belongs de jure 
to the Republic of Cyprus and remains therefore in essence an unresolved 
internal conflict.35 Notwithstanding the above, the external dimension of the 
de facto division of the island, including the roots of the conflict as well as its 
implications on the bilateral relations Cyprus maintains with Turkey will be 
addressed in the next and final part of this chapter. Suffice to note here in this 
respect that the case of Cyprus was also instrumental in the ‘crystallisation’ of 
good neighbourliness as a condition in the eu enlargement process.36 This 
chapter will however focus on the post-accession period and examine Cyprus’s 
commitment as a Member State towards good neighbourliness, within the 
framework of the regulatory regime put in place in the eu legal order ‘for 
the sole purpose of regulating the unprecedented situation in the eu of a 
Member State not exercising effective control over all its territory’.37
34 See (n 14). In Commons Hansard Written Answers (n 14), the division of the island of 
Cyprus was not listed among the border disputes involving current and/or prospective eu 
States but was ‘added’ at the end of these lists by the following mention: ‘In addition, 
Cyprus joined the eu as a divided island on 1 May 2004. The eu acquis is suspended in 
northern Cyprus which Turkey recognises as the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus”’.
35 Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 7–8, 325.
36 Ibid, 10–12, 20–21, 41–67; see also Basheska (n 4) 128–138.
37 Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 300.
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a Scope of Application of eu Law
After eu accession, the situation in the occupied areas of Cyprus is deemed 
unique to the extent that it entails in principle the integral suspension of the 
acquis in a delimited territory within a Member State.38 The accession negotia-
tions with Cyprus were conducted by the Republic of Cyprus on behalf of the 
whole island. This appears to indicate that eu law was applicable in principle 
to the areas beyond the control of the government but was suspended there 
temporarily, ab initio and a priori in toto.39 This was confirmed by the Court of 
Justice in Apostolides v Orams.40 Although this case does not actually involve 
the Republic of Cyprus itself but merely private litigants in a dispute over prop-
erty located in the occupied areas, it is interesting to return to this judgment 
(and to the corresponding Advocate General’s Opinion)41 to consider the scope 
of the suspension of eu law in the occupied areas and attempt to draw conclu-
sions with respect to neighbourliness.
In Apostolides v Orams, the Court was asked to clarify the scope of the sus-
pension of the acquis under Protocol 10 to the 2003 Treaty of Accession, in view 
in particular of the Brussels Regulation42 and the implications of such a sus-
pension on fundamental rights and freedoms in Cyprus. Legal actions were 
initially brought before the Cypriot courts by Mr Apostolides, who obtained 
two judgments in the Nicosia District Court against Mr and Mrs Orams, British 
citizens who had purchased his property in the areas not under the effective 
control of the Republic of Cyprus.43 These judgments were then registered in, 
and declared enforceable by the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of 
England in accordance with the Brussels Regulation.44 The Orams brought a 
successful challenge against the registration and enforcement order before 
the High Court Judge pursuant to Article 43 of the Brussels Regulation.45  
Mr Apostolides then contested that judgment by an appeal under Article 44 of 
38 For a detailed legal appraisal of the legal regime applicable to the occupied areas in 
Cyprus, see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) chapters 5 and 7.
39 Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 318.
40 Case C–420/07, Meletis Apostolides v David Charles Orams, Linda Elizabeth Orams [2009] 
I–3571 (Apostolides), paras 33–34; see e.g. Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 342–356.
41 Case C–420/07, Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 18 December 2008.
42 Council Regulation (ec) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters of 22 December 2000 [2001] oj L 12/1 (Brussels Regulation).
43 No 9968/04, 9 November 2004 and 19 April 2005 (Nicosia District Court). These judgments 
were confirmed by the Supreme Court of Cyprus in Apostolides v Orams, No 121/2005, 
21 December 2006.
44 Orders made by Master Eyre, 21 October 2005.
45 Orams v Apostolides (qb) [2007] 1 wlr 241.
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the Brussels Regulation before the Court of Appeal of England and Wales,46 
which initiated a preliminary reference procedure seeking interpretation of 
the Brussels Regulation in the light of Protocol 10.47
The Brussels Regulation is an instrument of secondary legislation which 
promotes the fundamental freedoms and the mutual recognition of judgments 
throughout the eu.48 As such, any exception to it should be interpreted literally 
and strictly, even if contained in an instrument of primary legislation.49 It is 
unavoidable that Protocol 10 has a restrictive impact on the territorial scope of 
application of the Brussels Regulation within the occupied areas.50 However, 
this is impossible if the application of the Brussels Regulation is sought by a 
court situated in the government-controlled area of the Republic of Cyprus, 
even when the action relates to property located in the non-government con-
trolled area.51 The Court rightly confirmed that the objective of Protocol 10 is 
literally the suspension of the acquis in the territory not under the effective 
control of the Republic and not in relation to that area.52 Anything to the con-
trary would have been found ‘beyond what is absolutely necessary’ under the 
given circumstances.53 In particular, there has never been an intention to 
exclude fully the application of provisions of eu law to the areas under the 
‘control’ of the Turkish Cypriot community.54 In fact, Turkish Cypriots residing 
in these areas have been found on several occasions ‘to derive individual rights 
under eu law’ from the protection afforded by fundamental human rights 
46 Apostolides v Orams, Appeal A2/2006/2114, ca hearing 18–19 June 2007.
47 Order No 2153/2007 in the ca, 19 June 2007; the reference was made on 13 September 2007, 
Meletis Apostolides v David Charles Orams, Linda Elizabeth Orams [2007] oj C 297/20. For 
a detailed account of the facts and of the procedural history, see Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 
340–344.
48 See Article 81 tfeu. See generally Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski (eds), Brussels i 
Regulation (2nd edn, Sellier, Munich 2012); see also Wendy Kennett, The enforcement of 
judgments in Europe (oup, Oxford 2000).
49 Apostolides (n 40) para 35; see also AG Kokott’s Opinion (n 41), pt 36. These two instru-
ments merely appear to have different scopes, lex generalis for the former and lex spe-
cialis for the latter and as a result, operate in different legal spheres; see Laulhé Shaelou 
(n 30) 345.
50 See AG Kokott’s Opinion (n 41) pts 25–31; Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 345.
51 See AG Kokott’s Opinion, ibid, pt 32; see also Apostolides (n 40) para. 38.
52 See Apostolides (n 40) para. 37; Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 346.
53 See AG Kokott’s Opinion (n 41) pts 35–38; see also Apostolides (n 40) para. 35.
54 See in particular Articles 2 (for the application of eu law to the Green Line) and 3 Protocol 
10 (for measures promoting the economic development of the non-government con-
trolled areas of the Republic of Cyprus); see AG Kokott’s Opinion (n 41) pt 40; Laulhé 
Shaelou (n 30) 346.
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under eu law and international law,55 and through the relative promotion of 
free movement through the Green Line.56 It follows from the above that the 
non-government controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus can fall within 
the material and personal scope of eu law, at least when fundamental indi-
vidual rights are at stake, and the scope of application of eu law in relation to 
these areas of Cyprus is variable.57
In the post-Lisbon era, with the eu’s fundamental values codified in the 
Treaties,58 it would appear reasonable to assume that the values ‘on which 
the Union is founded’59 would also apply in relation to and/or in the non- 
government controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus, within the limits of the 
suspension of the acquis in these areas (as interpreted by the ecj) and of 
the eventual withdrawal of such a suspension pursuant to Protocol 10.60 This 
should without any doubt include good neighbourliness as a principle arising 
55 ECtHR, Aziz v Cyprus [2005] 41 ehrr 11; see Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 328–333; see also Laulhé 
Shaelou (n 17) 199–200. The European Commission provides on its website that ‘[…] the 
suspension [of the acquis in the northern part of the island] does not affect the personal 
rights of Turkish Cypriots as eu citizens’; see <http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/turkish_cypriots/
index_en.htm> last accessed 15 December 2014.
56 Ibid. See also the Preamble of Protocol 10.
57 Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 327; see also Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 200, 207, 228–230 and Frank 
Hoffmeister, Legal aspects of the Cyprus Problem. Annan Plan and eu accession (Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden 2006) 208–211.
58 Article 2 teu and more generally Title i teu.
59 The scope of fundamental values and principles and their enforcement within the eu 
legal order arguably remain a key challenge for the European integration process and are 
currently the focus of intense intellectual debate and/or policymaking effort, in view 
in particular of recent ‘value crises’ in some Member States. See Carlos Closa et al., 
‘Reinforcing Rule of Law oversight in the European Union’ eui Working Papers rscas 
2014/25 for an exemplary attempt to approach the issue of Rule of Law oversight in the eu 
and suggest ways to address it through means of legal and policy analysis; see also Armin 
Von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis, ‘Systemic deficiency in the rule of law: what it is, 
what has been done, what can be done’ (2014) 51 cml Rev 59. For detailed analyses of 
recent crises in eu law, see Augustín José Menéndez, ‘The existential crisis of the European 
Union’ (2013) 14(5) German Law Journal 453–526 and Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Safeguarding 
democracy inside the eu. Brussels and the future of the liberal order’ (Transatlantic 
Academy Paper Series, Washington dc 2013). It should also be noted that the European 
Commission presented in March 2014 a framework to safeguard the Rule of Law in the 
eu; see <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/com_2014_158_en.pdf> last 
accessed 15 December 2014.
60 Article 1(2) Protocol 10. For an argumentation supporting the view that there has already 
been a partial and factual withdrawal of the suspension of the acquis, see Laulhé Shaelou 
(n 17) 230–233; see also Hoffmeister (n 57) 216.
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implicitly from Articles 3(5)61 and 4(3) teu62 and explicitly from Article 8 teu, to 
the extent that this provision promotes the values of the Union and ‘close and 
peaceful relations based on cooperation’ as characteristics of good neighbourli-
ness. It might appear difficult – and contrary to eu law – to impose an obligation 
of good neighbourliness directly on Cyprus in the handling of its internal affairs.63 
It is, however, inherent in Cyprus’s commitments as a Member State that the 
‘spirit’ of close cooperation should prevail in all its actions, especially when such 
actions fall within the broad scope of eu law. This leaves open the question of the 
nature and scope of the spirit of close cooperation in this context.
b Nature and Scope of Close Cooperation: A Unilateral ‘Duty’  
on Cyprus?
Although there is no express reference to close cooperation in Protocol 10 – a for-
tiori even less so in the form of a duty – it is argued that the various instruments 
composing the legal regime established under Protocol 10 are characterised by a 
strong spirit of close cooperation originating from the case law of the ecj.
The High Contracting Parties’ ‘strong support’ for the un peace talks and for 
a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem expressed in the Preamble 
of Protocol 10, in accordance with the relevant un Security Council Resolutions 
should be noted as a preliminary observation.64 The Preamble also expresses 
the desire that Cyprus’s eu accession should ‘benefit all Cypriot citizens and 
promote civil peace and reconciliation’.65 This seems to indicate the establish-
ment of a strong link between international and eu law in the promotion of 
fundamental values such as peace, prosperity and stability,66 and also arguably 
good neighbourliness in this context.67 Good neighbourliness in international 
61 As far as it refers to the promotion in the wider world of values and interests with respect 
to the principles of the un Charter.
62 See part 2 above.
63 See in particular Articles 4(1) to (2) and 5 teu. For a review of the potential limitations 
provided by Article 4(2) teu in the context of recent crises in certain Member States, see 
Closa et al. (n 59) 8.
64 Preamble, Protocol 10, first recital.
65 Ibid, seventh recital.
66 See Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 9, 31 (n 131), 50, 69–70, 199 (n 918).
67 Basheska writes: ‘The need for respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integ-
rity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus and for finding a legal solution to the problem 
was repeatedly stressed by actors in the international community. Such an approach is at 
the heart of the good neighbourliness principle based on un principles and maintained 
through the right and duties of states as established in international law’; see Basheska 
(n 4) 87–88 (footnote omitted).
n Please check the edit made in section numbering.
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law is based on the principle of sovereign equality of States,68 which would not 
be applicable per se to the situation of the occupied areas, to the extent that 
there are no internationally recognised authorities there.69 It is, however, clear 
that the actions of the government of the Republic of Cyprus are and must be 
in accordance with the relevant instruments of international law promoting 
peace and good neighbourliness,70 including within its own sovereign territory,71 
as Cyprus must fulfil in good faith its obligations arising under the un Charter.72 
This would not, however, necessarily translate into any duty, let alone any 
equivalent obligation, under eu law.73
Turning to the question of duty in the eu legal order, it is important to note 
that the original role of Protocol 10 was to shield the Republic of Cyprus from 
liability in the areas beyond the effective control of its government, but only to 
the extent that this was rendered necessary by the de facto partition of the 
island. The rationale for this was the fact that the Republic could not guarantee 
the implementation and the enforcement of eu rules in the occupied areas, in 
breach of its commitments under the 2003 Treaty of Accession.74 As previously 
examined, however, with respect to the scope of application of eu law there 
68 Ibid, 7, 11–13.
69 As per uncsr 541(1982) available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/541> last accessed 
11 August 2014. See Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 38, 47, 187, 317–319; see also Stefan Talmon, ‘The 
Cyprus Question before the ecj’ (2001) 12 ejil 727.
70 Confidence building measures are a good example of the promotion of such fundamental 
values; see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 226–230. In the renewed 2014 framework for talks 
between the leaders of the two communities under the auspices of the un Secretary 
General’s Good Offices mission, there is an express commitment to ‘efforts to implement 
confidence building measures that will provide dynamic impetus to the prospect for a 
unified Cyprus’; see para. 7, Joint Statement on Cyprus talks by the leaders of the two 
communities available at: <http://famagusta-gazette.com/joint-statement-on-cyprus 
-talks-full-text-p22275-69.htm> last accessed 15 December 2014.
71 As per unscr 353(1974) available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/353> and 367(1975) 
available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/367> last accessed 15 December 2014.
72 Article 2 un Charter, as complemented by the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
un Charter, unga Res 2625 (xxv) (24 October 1970).
73 It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the legal nature of international law 
instruments in general or those related to Cyprus in the eu legal order. Suffice it to note 
here that AG Kokott in her Opinion in the Apostolides case (paras 45 and 48) classified the 
unscr as predominantly political and as such, not entailing any obligation under eu law 
‘to refrain from recognising judgments of Greek Cypriot courts which relate to claims to 
ownership of land in the Turkish Cypriot area’ due to lack of legal certainty.
74 Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 196.
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and the failure thereto, this ‘exclusion of liability clause’ was to be interpreted 
strictly and could under no circumstances exempt the Republic of Cyprus fully 
from its obligations arising under eu law, and in particular from Article 4(3) 
teu.75 Looking at the secondary legislative instruments on the development 
of free movement across the Green Line and economic development in the 
occupied areas, they appear to outline ‘the importance of coordination between 
the two sides in this special regime’.76 This interpretation of the legal regime 
established in Protocol 10 is arguably rooted in the case law of the ecj, the 
Anastasiou saga.
The Anastasiou saga involved free movement of goods claims brought by a 
Cypriot trader in the uk against the background of Cyprus’s association with 
the eu and subsequently of Cyprus’s accession to the eu. These claims were 
referred to the ecj by various English courts at different levels in the judicial 
system between 1992 and 2001.77 They related to the application of various 
provisions of the then ec law, including under the ec–Cyprus Association 
Agreement and related instruments, to the trade in the uk of goods originating 
from the areas not under the effective control of the government of the 
Republic of Cyprus. In Anastasiou i,78 the Court ruled that ‘the need for unifor-
mity in Community policy and practice’, based on the ‘principle of mutual reli-
ance and cooperation between the competent authorities’, required that the 
relevant provisions of ec law be interpreted strictly and with exclusive refer-
ence to the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus when exports to 
the Community were involved.79 This ruling was confirmed in Anastasiou ii80 
75 This is confirmed by the ninth recital of the Preamble to Protocol 10 and more precisely 
by Article 3(2) Protocol 10 with respect to the measures to be created under Article 3(1) 
Protocol to support the economic development in the occupied areas which ‘shall not 
affect the application of the acquis under the conditions set out in the Accession Treaty 
in any other part of the Republic of Cyprus’; ibid 283.
76 Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 284, emphasis added.
77 For a full and comprehensive legal analysis of the Anastasiou saga, see e.g. Stéphanie 
Laulhé Shaelou, ‘The ecj and the Anastasiou saga: principles of Europeanisation through 
economic governance’ (2007) 18(3) ebl Rev 619–640; see also Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 32–40, 
70–84.
78 Case C–432/92, R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte SP Anastasiou 
(Pissouri) Ltd and others [1994] ecr I–3087 (Anastasiou i).
79 Anastasiou i, paras 38 and 54; see Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 308–13.
80 Case C–219/98, R v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte SP Anastasiou 
(Pissouri) Ltd and others [2000] ecr I–5241 (Anastasiou ii). See Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 
313–5.
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(to the extent that the latter case was distinguished from the former) and was 
further developed in Anastasiou iii.81
Anastasiou ii occurred in the context of the ‘triangular trading relationship 
between the eu, Cyprus as a candidate country, and Turkey as an associated 
country’.82 As a result of the judgment of the Court in Anastasiou i, Turkish 
Cypriot goods were first exported to Turkey for certification before being ‘re-
exported’ to the eu ‘outside of the scope of the eu–Cyprus Association and 
prima facie within the scope of the eu–Turkey Association Agreement’.83 The 
Court ruled that in the absence of proper certification, Turkish Cypriot goods 
had to be treated as goods originating from a third country subject to import 
duties if imported into the eu, including through Turkey. The principles estab-
lished in Anastasiou i remained, however, largely untouched since the Court 
in Anastasiou ii focused mainly on the technical requirements arising from 
the non-privileged treatment of these goods (physically located outside of the 
eu),84 and of their importation into the eu.85
In a refinement of Anastasiou ii, the Court in Anastasiou iii looked this 
time at the issue of certification of goods in the internal market, both from 
the point of view of the origin of the goods and of the authorities competent 
to issue such certificates to introduce these goods into circulation in the eu. It 
ruled this time that ‘the phytosanitary certificate required in order to bring 
those plants into the Community must […] be issued in their country of ori-
gin by, or under the supervision of, the competent authorities of that country’,86 
thereby closing the door to ‘indirect trade’ through Turkey and confirming the 
principle of the ‘direct trade’ of Turkish Cypriot goods in the eu through 
the government controlled area of the Republic of Cyprus.87 The Court 
referred to the ‘exclusive competence’ of the country of origin to issue the 
requested certificates and to the ‘legitimacy’ of the authorities legally authorised 
81 Case C–140/02, R v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte SP Anastasiou 
(Pissouri) Ltd and Others [2003] ecr I–10635 (Anastasiou iii).
82 See Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 313.
83 Ibid.
84 In Anastasiou ii, ‘the Court merely considered that the certificates were issued by the 
competent authorities in the importing State and did not look for the legitimate issuing 
authority in the State of origin of the goods’; see Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 315.
85 Ibid 313–314. The Court also focused on the cooperation between the importing State and 
the State of origin when a third country is involved within the framework of the applica-
ble instruments of eu law, of relevance to the last part of this chapter, see (n 122).
86 Anastasiou iii, para. 75 (emphasis added); see Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 316 and (n 95).
87 Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 315–316.
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to carry out this task in accordance with Anastasiou i.88 It has been argued that 
with Anastasiou iii, ‘the principle of mutual reliance and cooperation referred 
to in Anatasiou i in the context of association becomes applicable to intra-
State trade relations in the context of accession, in addition to its usual appli-
cation to inter-State trade relations within the eu’.89 In what can be seen as a 
direct application of the case law of the Court, Article 4(5) of the Green Line 
Regulation90 dealing with the treatment of goods coming from the non-
controlled area of the Republic of Cyprus to the area controlled by the gov-
ernment91 provides that such goods ‘shall be accompanied by a document 
issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, duly authorised by the 
European Commission in agreement with the government of the Republic 
of Cyprus’. By virtue of this provision, the European Commission issued a 
Decision addressed to the Republic of Cyprus confirming the above.92 Upon 
receipt of such goods with the relevant certification, the competent authori-
ties of the Republic of Cyprus were then required to check the authenticity of 
the document received from the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and 
whether it corresponds with the consignment.93 Provided that this is the case 
and the goods are ‘destined for consumption in the Republic of Cyprus’, the 
Republic of Cyprus shall not treat the goods as ‘imported’94 and such goods 
shall have the status of ‘Community goods’.95
 Lessons Learnt
It has been argued that the Green Line Regulation ‘not only refers to the pri-
mary responsibility of the Republic of Cyprus in intra-[S]tate trade but also 
promotes co-operation between trade authorities/bodies in Cyprus as a result 
88 Ibid 317.
89 Ibid.
90 Council Regulation (ec) No 866/2004 on a regime under Article 2 Protocol 10 of the Act of 
Accession (Green Line Regulation) [2004] oj L 161/128.
91 Such goods must be ‘wholly obtained’ or ‘have undergone their last, substantial, economi-
cally justified processing or working in an undertaking equipped for that purpose in the 
areas not under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus’; see 
Article 4(1) Green Line Regulation.
92 Commission Decision (ec) No 604/2004 [2004] oj L 272/12.
93 Article 4(6) Green Line Regulation. For the legal status of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of 
Commerce, see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 296–297, 311, 319 and 327.
94 Article 4(7) Green Line Regulation.
95 Provided they comply with the requirements laid down in Article 4(1) to (10) Green Line 
Regulation; see Article 4(11) Green Line Regulation.
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of national regulatory governance’.96 The spirit of close cooperation97 appears 
to be inherent in all instruments of secondary legislation forming, together 
with Protocol 10, the regulatory regime addressing the de facto partition of the 
island, extending to and including a future comprehensive settlement leading 
to the full integration of the Turkish Cypriot community into the eu.98 By anal-
ogy with Article 8(1) teu, close cooperation is of essence in this instance of de 
facto division of an eu Member State and offers, as some have argued with 
respect to Article 8(1) teu, a ‘pragmatic solution’ to a ‘politically sensitive area’ 
or problem.99 In the context of Cyprus, close cooperation appears as a strong – 
albeit not unlimited100 – unilateral commitment on the part of the Republic, 
whose prime objective is the avoidance of the legitimisation and/or recognition 
of the ‘authorities’ on the other side and includes – if and when necessary – 
elements of the ad hoc integration of the Turkish Cypriot community into the 
eu pending a political solution. The idea of ‘progressive integration’ can also 
be found in Article 8(1) teu, even if it should in principle fall short of full inte-
gration.101 In the case of Cyprus, the outcome ought to be different since the 
occupied areas are and remain a constituent part of the sovereign territory of 
the Republic of Cyprus and as such of the eu territory, and are committed to 
full eu integration, albeit deferred. Moreover, any instance of ‘far reaching 
integration’ through good neighbourliness should be based on reciprocity, 
96 Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 318.
97 For a more formal and explicit expression of the duty of close cooperation and of good 
neighbourliness in Cyprus, see Protocol 3 on the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus [2003] oj 
L 236/940, addressing the bilateral relations between the Republic of Cyprus and the uk 
in the form of ‘closer cooperation’; see Laulhé Shaelou (2010) 158–171. On 15 January 2014, 
the two governments signed an ‘arrangement’ giving ‘increased flexibility to develop private 
property’ within the sbas in Cyprus, which they deemed to form an ‘excellent example’ of 
their good cooperation; see <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-cyprus-joint 
-communique> last accessed 15 December 2014.
98 The terms of which will be determined pursuant to Article 4 Protocol 10.
99 Van Elsuwege and Petrov (n 3) 695.
100 For an example of a proposal for secondary legislation prepared by the European 
Commission but opposed in its current form by Cyprus in the Council, to the extent that 
the proposal is not based on the principle of mutual recognition and close cooperation as 
expressed in instruments of eu law deriving from Protocol 10 and may, as a result, lead to 
the ‘upgrading’ or recognition of the ‘authorities’ in the occupied areas, see Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on special conditions for trade with those areas not under the effec-
tive control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus COM(2004) 466 final (‘direct 
trade proposal’); see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 81, 197, 279–281, 304, 313–320.
101 Van Elsuwege and Petrov (n 3) refer to ‘far-reaching integration’ based upon the export of 
the acquis to non-eu Member States, presenting an alternative to full eu membership, 695.
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which cannot really apply to Cyprus within its own sovereign territory. In this 
context, however, good neighbourliness can be said to reinforce the general 
commitment incumbent on Cyprus as a Member State to act in the spirit of 
close cooperation to benefit ‘all Cypriot citizens and promote civil peace and 
reconciliation’.102 This appears to constitute a minimum threshold, even if it 
falls short of imposing any formal unilateral duty on Cyprus with respect to its 
own internal affairs.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the above analysis, there appears to be a 
‘higher’ (specially framed and country-specific) threshold under eu law which 
would need to be satisfied on the part of Cyprus for actions falling within the 
material and/or personal scope of eu law (customs union, ccp and internal 
market in particular),103 as may be required at the eu level and/or derive from 
instruments of eu law. It generally transpires from the ecj’s case law that the 
rules of the internal market are deemed applicable to intra-State and to inter-
State relations.104 In the case of Cyprus, however, this is not a case of the 
straightforward application of the rules of the internal market in its territory, 
but a differentiated one due to the de facto division of the island. Accordingly, 
as a ‘counterpart’ to this higher commitment incumbent on Cyprus deriving 
from the application of the internal market rules in this special setting, with an 
unusual bearing on internal affairs, its willingness to consent to the various 
instruments of eu law pertaining to this special regime is sought at all times, 
within the framework of Protocol 10 as lex specialis.105 This appears to be the 
case even for instruments which would not normally require unanimity and/
or the express consent of the Republic of Cyprus, as they have an exclusive 
competence of the eu, such as the ccp or the Customs Union, legal basis.106 
102 Preamble, Protocol 10.
103 For the application of these eu objectives/policies to the occupied areas of Cyprus, see 
Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 288–304.
104 For the free movement of goods, see Case C–293/02, Jersey Produce Marketing Organisation 
Ltd v State of Jersey and others [2005] ecr I–9543.
105 On the basis of Articles 1(2) and 2(1) Protocol 10 (and 4 upon a settlement), all requiring 
unanimity in the Council to adopt measures under Protocol 10. The extent to which 
Article 3(1) Protocol 10 promoting measures of economic development in the occupied 
areas of Cyprus constitutes an autonomous legal basis subject to the same procedural 
rules is more uncertain (with no such express references being made therein); see Laulhé 
Shaelou (n 17) 282–283.
106 See in this respect the divergence among the eu institutions over the proper legal basis 
relating to the (still pending) direct trade proposal (n 100). The European Commission 
had initially proposed the then Article 133 ec (now 207 tfeu (ccp)), whereas the Council, 
subsequently backed by the European Parliament, insisted on Protocol 10 as the proper 
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This special regime also arguably requires the general support of other Member 
States in accordance with the duty of loyal cooperation in the eu. In this con-
text, therefore, it is believed that the above scenario involving a specific and 
unilateral commitment by a single Member State towards close cooperation is 
yet another manifestation of good neighbourliness within the eu. The next and 
final part of this chapter will examine another set of neighbouring relations, 
this time involving bilateral relations between two States and eu external rela-
tions though its enlargement policy.
4 The Outer Application of the Principle of Good Neighbourliness 
‘from outside’ the eu: The Case of Turkey
When a dispute involves two States, one of which is a Member State of the eu 
and the other a third country associated to the eu (a ‘vertical dispute’),107 there 
can be a natural – albeit probably immature and certainly unequal and insuf-
ficient – tendency primarily to observe the conditions imposed on the ‘out-
sider’ in the dispute from the eu perspective, through the eu conditionality 
policy in particular.108 It has been argued that in vertical disputes, ‘Member 
States can either act on their own behalf with respect to their bilateral disputes 
with candidate countries or on the behalf of the Union regarding ‘eu-wide 
issues’.109 This would appear to give a lot of leeway to Member States, including 
during the enlargement process, with the inherent risk that ‘instead of being 
used as an instrument to contribute to the settlement of international disputes 
‘in a spirit of good neighbourliness and bearing in mind the overall eu inter-
ests’, the conditionality principle in such cases serves the national interests 
and political considerations of individual Member States’.110 It is quite clear 
legal basis for such an instrument. See Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 280–281; see also Working 
Document of the European Parliament, Committee on International Trade, Rapporteur 
Niccolo Rinaldi, 13 March 2014 available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?pubRef=−//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-530.081+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> 
last accessed 15 December 2014.
107 Rodin (n 24) 153–171, 156; see also Basheska (n 4) 121–122.
108 This is partly due to reliance on the – flawed, as has been demonstrated recently, see (n 59) 
– assumption that ‘within’ the Union, all Member States ‘fundamentally and unavoidably 
adhere to the values’ of the Union, as enshrined in Article 2 teu. The ‘problem’ must there-
fore come from outside the Union […]; see Kochenov in Petrov and Van Elsuwege (n 3) 48.
109 Rodin (n 24) 156, as cited in Basheska (n 4) 121.
110 Basheska (n 4) 122 (footnote omitted); see also the notion of ‘creeping nationalisation 
of enlargement’ by Christophe Hillion, ‘eu enlargement’ in Paul P Craig and Gráinne 
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that good neighbourly relations, including with Cyprus, form an essential 
part  of the accession process for Turkey.111 This condition has been ably 
explored and developed in previous writing on the topic112 as well as in other 
contributions in this volume.113 What is less clear, however, are the current 
(post-Lisbon) implications of such conditionality on the eu-Cyprus-Turkey 
relations, to identify the meaning and scope of good neighbourliness for all par-
ties involved, and the future prospects of such relations. The fourth and final 
part of this chapter will attempt briefly to shed some light on these questions.
Turning first to the nature and scope of good neighbourliness for Turkey, the 
foundations of Turkey’s obligation towards Cyprus can be established quite 
clearly both in international law and in eu law (in the context of the eu exter-
nal relations). In international law, Turkey’s obligations towards Cyprus with 
respect to the protection of human rights have been made clear by the 
Strasbourg Court. Such obligations extend to State liability and compensation 
for violation of property rights ongoing since the Turkish invasion of the island 
in 1974.114 This was confirmed by the Strasbourg Court only very recently in a 
landmark decision.115 Despite the fact that this case law is based primarily on 
de Búrca, The evolution of eu law (2nd edn, oup, ny 2011) 210: some Member States 
might ‘hijack’ the enlargement process to settle/promote bilateral relations in their 
favour.
111 This is reiterated regularly in the context of accession negotiations, as a constituent ele-
ment of the eu–Turkey relations but also in the ‘normalisation of relations between 
Turkey and all Member States’, with express reference to Cyprus; for a latest example, see 
the eu–Turkey Association Council, 52nd meeting, 23 June 2014 available at: <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/143331.pdf> last 
accessed 15 December 2014.
112 For a review of the bon voisinage clause as applied in the context of the eu–Turkey–
Cyprus relations, see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 20, 59–60, 67 (fns 294–296 and 301–302 for 
further literature on the topic). See also Hillion (n 110).
113 See Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘Good Neighbourliness as a Condition for Accession to the 
European Union: Finding the Balance between Law and Politics’ in this volume; see also 
Basheska (n 4) 128–138.
114 Cyprus v Turkey (No 25781/94, 10 May 2001, ECtHR) where Turkey was found responsible 
for grave violations of fundamental human rights in Cyprus, inter alia under Article 1 
Protocol 1 echr (denial of access, control, use and enjoyment of Greek Cypriot property 
as well as of any compensation for the interference with property rights of Greek-Cypriot 
owners).
115 Cyprus v Turkey (No 25781/94, just satisfaction, 12 May 2014, ECtHR) where the Court ruled 
(by a majority of the Grand Chamber) that ‘the passage of time since the delivery of the 
principal judgment on 10 May 2001 did not preclude it from examining the Cypriot 
Government’s just satisfaction claims’; see <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
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the echr and does not refer to or rely on the good neighbourliness principle 
as embodied in instruments of international law, there is no doubt that viola-
tions of several fundamental principles of the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations can be identified indirectly through this case law.116 This last remark 
also applies to the more detailed principles embodied in Article 2 of the un 
Charter, which have been found to form the main legal basis of good neigh-
bourliness in international law.117 They include the duty to fulfil in good faith 
the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter, the obligation to 
peacefully settle international disputes and the duty to refrain in international 
State relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State.118 Turkey therefore also appears to be in 
breach of these more detailed principles and of the duties, positively or nega-
tively framed, deriving therefrom, to the point that good neighbourliness 
between the two countries has been and is still regularly at stake.119 There has 
search.aspx?i=001-144151#{“itemid”:[“001-144151”]}> last accessed 15 December 2014. The 
Cypriot government had only submitted just satisfaction claims for the violations com-
mitted by Turkey against two specific groups of people: the missing persons and the 
enclaved Greek-Cypriot residents of the Karpas peninsula; just satisfaction with a view to 
compensate the Cypriot State was not sought; see Sébastien Platon, ‘Quand les racines 
internationales de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme lui donne des ailes: la con-
sécration du droit à indemnisation dans les affaires étatiques’ (2014) rdlf, No 17. The 
Grand Chamber of the Court reminded Turkey of its obligation to comply with the prin-
cipal judgment in the inter-State case, irrespective of the case law of the same Court 
whereby claims presented by individuals for the violation of their property rights have 
now been rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (Demopoulos and Others v 
Turkey, Application No 46113/92 (admissibility), 5 March 2010; see Laulhé Shaelou (n 30) 
333–340.
116 Of the duty to respect inter alia the personality of other States, the inviolability of the 
territorial integrity and political independence of States and/or to comply fully and in 
good faith with State international obligations and live in peace with each other; see 
Basheska (n 4) 11 for a complete list of such duties.
117 Ibid 20.
118 For a detailed analysis of each of these principles and of the rights and duties on states 
deriving therefrom, see Basheska (n 4) 20–34.
119 There are many examples of regular political tensions between Turkey and Cyprus, 
including in the recently renewed Cyprus talks; Cyprus’s eu Council Presidency in the 
latter half of 2012; hydrocarbons in Cyprus and the multiple violations of Cyprus’s territo-
rial waters and airspace related to hydrocarbon exploration; see <http://www.euronews 
.com/tag/turkey-cyprus-relation/> last accessed 15 December 2014. In Turkey’s 2013 
Progress Report, the Commission called on Turkey to ‘stop blocking the accession of 
Member States to international organisations and mechanisms’ and reiterated the rights 
of eu Member States to enter into bilateral agreements and ‘to explore and exploit their 
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been, however, no dispute brought before any international court of law based 
directly on the violation of good neighbourliness principles by Turkey towards 
Cyprus. The Luxembourg Court is no exception, in line with its jurisdiction 
over matters of eu law120 and its approach to international law.121 The ecj, 
indeed, has never dealt directly with the Turkey–Cyprus relations, despite 
being invited to do so on several occasions,122 hence the need to turn to the 
legal and political framework established at the eu level to address the eu–
Cyprus–Turkey relations.
natural resources’; see <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/
package/brochures/turkey_2013.pdf> 3 and 17, last accessed 15 December 2014.
120 In the light in particular of Article 344 tfeu (exclusive jurisdiction of the Court) and 
Article 273 tfeu (‘optional’ jurisdiction of the Court) for bilateral disputes involving eu 
Member States falling within the scope of eu law or outside it, respectively. A bilateral 
dispute involving an eu Member State and a candidate country would fall prima facie 
outside the scope of eu law and be settled in accordance to the principles of international 
law, see Basheska (n 4) 76–77.
121 In view of the Court’s ‘robustly dualist’ reasoning in the Kadi cases where it refused to 
allow a un Security Council resolution to enjoy primacy over eu law and proceeded with 
a full and rigorous judicial review of the lawfulness of all eu acts in question, including 
those designed to implement un Security Council resolutions (Joined Cases C–402/05P 
and C–415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2008] ecr I–6351 and 
Joined Cases C–584/10 P, C–593/10 P and C–595/10 P, Commission, Council, uk v Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi, 18 July 2013); see Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the 
International Legal Order after Kadi’ (2010) 51(1) Harvard Int’l L.J. 1–49, 23.
122 Within the framework of the Association Agreements between the eu and Cyprus and 
the eu and Turkey, the Court had ruled on the cooperation between the importing State 
and the State of origin – involving in that case the importation to eu Member States of 
Turkish Cypriot goods through Turkey – that it is not for Member States to ‘impose further 
conditions on the importer who has resorted to such a procedure’, as this would imply the 
‘taking into consideration of the reasons for which the requested certificate has not been 
issued by the country of origin’; Anastasiou ii, paras 40–42; see (n 84); see also Laulhé 
Shaelou (n 17) 35 and Panos Koutrakos, ‘Legal issues of ec–Cyprus trade relations’ (2003) 
52 iclq 489–498. After Cyprus’s eu accession, the Court’s analysis in the Apostolides case 
was limited to ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the scope of the Brussels Regulation 
(n 42): ‘In the case in the main proceedings, the action is between individuals, and its 
object is to obtain damages for unlawfully taking possession of land, the delivery up of 
that land, its restoration to its original state and the cessation of any other unlawful inter-
vention. That action is brought not against conduct or procedures which involve an exer-
cise of public powers by one of the parties to the case, but against acts carried out by 
individuals’, para 45. There was in any case no mention of Turkey in the judgment, other 
than the fact that only Turkey recognises the so-called ‘trnc’, para. 19; see also AG Kokott’s 
Opinion in this case, para 45, as commented on in (n 73).
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In eu law Turkey’s obligations towards Cyprus are largely framed within the 
context of enlargement policy and therefore also directly involve the eu. From 
quite early on in the process, efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem would ‘form 
part of the enhanced political dialogue’ between the eu and Turkey123 and it 
was clear that the absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle on 
Turkey’s road to the eu.124 The Negotiating Framework with Turkey125 lays 
down in Section 6 the guiding principles to measure the accession negotiations 
with Turkey, with reference in particular to the following requirements: (i) the 
Copenhagen criteria; (ii) ‘Turkey’s unequivocal commitment to good neigh-
bourly relations and its undertaking to resolve any outstanding border disputes 
in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accor-
dance with the [un] Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the [icj]’; (iii) 
Turkey’s continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement 
of the Cyprus problem, including through the ‘normalisation of bilateral rela-
tions between Turkey and all eu Member States, including the Republic of 
Cyprus’; and (iv) ‘the fulfilment of Turkey’s obligations under the Association 
Agreement and its Additional Protocol extending the Agreement to all new eu 
Member States, in particular those pertaining to the eu–Turkey customs 
union, as well as the implementation of the Accession Partnership, as regularly 
revised’.126 Good neighbourliness therefore appears as an autonomous require-
ment for Turkey, separate from the Copenhagen criteria which Turkey was 
found to meet ‘sufficiently’ for accession negotiations to be opened,127 from 
bilateral relations between Turkey and all eu Member States, including Cyprus, 
and from the fulfilment of technical obligations by Turkey under the 
Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol. Apart from the rights and 
obligations deriving from the Association Agreement and other related legal 
instruments, the remainder of the requirements set out in Section  6 of the 
Negotiating Framework do not however seem to attract ‘strict’ liability for 
Turkey. This appears to be verified in Section 5 of the Negotiating Framework, 
123 Commission’s 2003 Progress Report on Turkey available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
archives/pdf/ key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf>; see also Commission’s 2007 Progress 
Report on Turkey available at <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/
nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf> both last accessed 15 December 2014.
124 See Christophe Hillion (ed), eu Enlargement, a legal approach (Hart, Oxford 2004) 19; see 
also Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 61.
125 Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_
en.pdf> (Negotiating Framework) last accessed 15 December 2014; see Laulhé Shaelou 
(n 17) 44, 62, 65–67.
126 Negotiating Framework, ibid.
127 Ibid, Section 4.
0002526944.INDD   208 5/2/2015   1:16:38 PM
209On The ‘edge’ Of Good Neighbourliness In Eu Law
301494
which provides that only a ‘serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the prin-
ciples of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded’128 could trigger a 
suspension of the negotiations and the formulation of ‘conditions’ for their 
eventual resumption. Even if one considers that good neighbourliness ought 
to be included in the principles and values on which the Union is founded (as 
argued above),129 the express reference to a breach of such principles and val-
ues in Turkey rather than by Turkey would appear to exclude prima facie such 
breach in the context of Turkey’s external relations, including a priori neigh-
bouring relations with eu Member States.
Turkey’s only specific obligations towards eu Member States would therefore 
appear to derive from the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol, 
which Turkey ought to have extended to all new eu Member States as a result 
of the 2004 enlargement but failed to with regard to Cyprus.130 The eu addressed 
the legal implications of Turkey’s attitude in a ‘counter-declaration’ adopted by 
the Council.131 This is a political declaration which nevertheless included a 
‘revision clause’, whereby the Council reiterated that Turkey’s failure to imple-
ment its obligations in full would affect the ‘overall progress in the negotia-
tions’.132 As a result, the requirement regarding the normalisation of Turkey’s 
bilateral relations with Cyprus was expressly referred to for the first time in 
the legally binding Accession Partnership.133 Almost ten years later, however, 
Turkey has still not complied in full with its obligations of ‘non-discriminatory 
128 Ibid, emphasis added.
129 The choice of terms in relation to the Negotiating Framework (principles, requirements, 
rules) is quite interesting, as none of them appears to indicate the existence of values 
underlying the eu’s relations with Turkey. Values as enshrined in Article 2 teu should 
indeed be distinguished from all of the above; see in this respect Kochenov in Petrov and 
Van Elsuwege (n 3) 52–54 and 60.
130 Following the signature of the Additional Protocol with the ten new Member States on 30 
June 2005, Turkey issued a unilateral statement on 29 July 2005 confirming that ‘the signa-
ture, ratification and implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of 
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol’; see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 
65. Turkey claims that it will not move to the full and non-discriminatory implementation 
of the Additional Protocol towards Cyprus until and unless the eu allows for direct trade 
with the occupied areas.
131 Declaration by the ec and its Member States on Turkey Doc 12541/05 (Press 243) 
(Declaration); see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 65–66.
132 Declaration, ibid, para 3.
133 Council Decision (ec) No 235/2001 of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities and condi-
tions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey [2001] oj L 
85/13, as amended; see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 66.
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implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement’ and, 
in particular, has failed to remove ‘all restrictions on vessels and aircraft regis-
tered in Cyprus or whose last port of call was in Cyprus’.134 Due to the lack of 
progress in this respect, the eu has since 2006 maintained measures freezing 
negotiations on eight chapters relevant to Turkey’s restrictions regarding the 
Republic of Cyprus,135 with the result that accession negotiations with Turkey 
have come to a standstill.136 In the meantime, the eu has ‘urged Turkey to 
avoid any kind of threat or action directed against a Member State, or source of 
friction or actions, which could damage good neighbourly relations and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes’.137
 Lessons Learnt
The absence of ‘normal’ bilateral relations between Turkey and the Republic of 
Cyprus over the years has meant that neighbourly relations between these two 
countries are not based on reciprocity and are addressed primarily in the con-
text of eu-Turkey relations (and not as a ‘vertical dispute’). Even if the non-
recognition by Turkey of the Republic of Cyprus did not prevent the start of the 
accession negotiations as it was not a pre-condition to their commencement,138 
it has become increasingly important in the context of the accession negotia-
tions, to the point that it provoked their ‘re-framing’.139 It also provided eu 
Member States, including Cyprus, with an added opportunity to use their right 
to hold up Turkey’s progress towards accession during the benchmarking 
134 Commission’s 2013 Progress Report on Turkey (n 119) 4. For a legal analysis of the non-
implementation by Turkey of the provisions of the eu–Turkey customs union and the 
free movement of goods, see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 63–64.
135 gaerc Conclusions, 11 December 2006, endorsed by the European Council on 14/15 
December 2006. Negotiations will not be opened for eight chapters and no chapter will be 
provisionally closed ‘until the Commission confirms that Turkey has fully implemented 
the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement’; see Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 66.
136 After almost ten years of accession negotiations, only thirteen chapters have been opened 
for negotiations and one provisionally closed; see Turkey’s 2013 Progress Report (n 119) 4. 
The Commission notes that ‘[w]ork has been interrupted over the years on a number of 
negotiating chapters due to lack of consensus amongst Member States’; ibid. In particular, 
no chapters were opened between mid-2010 to June 2013, where the Council agreed to 
open the chapter on regional policy; ibid.
137 Turkey’s 2013 Progress Report (n 119) 4; see also European Council conclusions, 23–24 
October 2014, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/145397.pdf>, 15.
138 See Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 66.
139 The fulfilment by Turkey of its obligations under the Additional Protocol has become a 
‘routine’ requirement in the context of the accession negotiations; ibid 68.
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process included in the accession negotiations.140 This last remark raises the 
question of whether, in view of Article 4(3) teu and/or in the spirit of 8(1) teu, 
Cyprus should unilaterally block the provisional opening or closing of negotia-
tion chapters, as it has already done with respect to the opening of six other 
chapters.141 Arguably, the right to delay a candidate country’s like Turkey’s 
accession process is a collective prerogative of the Member States, the individ-
ual use of which could appear prima facie contrary to the spirit of good neigh-
bourliness promoted by Article 8(1) teu (and expressly referred to in the 
Negotiating Framework for Turkey). While the unanimity requirement pro-
vides the opportunity for a single Member State to disapprove of benchmarks 
and/or of their evaluation (by exercising its ‘veto’), it is reasonable to expect 
that the grounds for such disapproval should be ‘related to compliance with 
accession criteria’.142 For Cyprus, the lack of reciprocity in neighbouring rela-
tions with Turkey has proved to have a direct impact on Turkey’s fulfilment of 
its legal obligations under the Association Agreement and could as such pro-
vide a legitimate opportunity to exercise this right individually.
This last remark appears to raise the ultimate question of the future prospects 
of the eu–Turkey relations and in particular, of the impact of such relations in 
the broad framework of the eu Treaties, with reference in particular to the values 
of the Union and to the principle of effectiveness of eu law. Beyond the discus-
sions related to the lack of progress of the accession negotiations and to the 
future of Turkey within the eu,143 the suitability of Article 49 teu as the legal 
basis for the eu–Turkey relations has been questioned variously and in different 
quarters.144 The hypothetical or actual advantage of using Article 8(2) teu to 
140 In line with the conditionality generally introduced in accession negotiations, Section 21 
of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey provides for unanimity of the Council for the 
provisional closure and, where appropriate, opening of each negotiating chapter; see 
Laulhé Shaelou (n 17) 67–68.
141 See <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/1567/156711 
.htm#note423> last accessed 15 December 2014. It should be noted that France is also 
blocking the opening of negotiations on five further chapters which are regarded as ‘not 
relevant’ if Turkey is not to join the eu one day; ibid.
142 Hillion (n 110) 202–203.
143 With reference in particular to the fact that the accession negotiations with Turkey are an 
‘open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand’ and to the 
Union’s absorption capacity; see Section 2 of the Negotiating Framework; ibid 203–205.
144 Hillion (n 110) criticised the way Member States have ‘tempered’ the fundamentals of inte-
gration with ‘domestic concerns’ in the Negotiating Framework with Turkey, which envis-
ages the creation of permanent safeguard clauses in the Accession Treaty, potentially 
falling short of full membership, 211 and 215; see also Christophe Hillion, ‘Negotiating 
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frame Turkey’s future relations with the eu (in conjunction with Article 216 or 
217 tfeu, if Article 8 teu is found not to constitute an autonomous material 
legal basis for the procedure along with Article 218 tfeu),145 would be the con-
tinued promotion of the Union’s value in more flexible terms, while at the same 
time avoiding ‘false hopes’ of accession and remaining binding on the Member 
States.146 However, this would represent a ‘downgrading’ of Turkey’s relations 
with the Union, arguably to gain flexibility within the conditionality; whereas on 
the other hand, the Union’s values would remain unchanged. In this respect, it 
has been argued that Article 8 teu ‘impedes the Union from entering into spe-
cial relationship with neighbouring countries refusing to commit themselves 
to the values of the Union. The same would be the case for countries actively 
obstructing such a commitment. Finally, the limitation would arguably also 
apply in an unsatisfactory situation where no signs of improvement are shown 
over time’.147 Turkey is supposed to have passed that ‘entry point’ a decade ago 
but has not subsequently maintained momentum. Under Article 8 teu, it would 
appear that the point of entry characterising good neighbourliness in the eu 
legal order also constitutes the foundation against which all neighbouring coun-
tries are evaluated, be they associated to the Union or not, and below which none 
should fall at any time. Moving the legal basis from Article 49 teu to Article 8 
teu would have the benefit of providing Turkey with an impetus for a ‘fresh’ 
interpretation of the Union’s values, potentially beneficial to all parties. This 
would greatly depend, however, on whether a political decision on the ‘renewed’ 
conclusion of the eu–Turkey relations is ultimately achieved, as well as on 
Turkey’s own interpretation of this relationship and values, while other coun-
tries such as Ukraine move rapidly towards eu membership.
5 Conclusion
This chapter has tried to identify and explain first the relevance and then the 
importance of the good neighbourliness principle in the context of the relations 
a single Member State can maintain with its neighbours, both from within and 
outside the eu, no matter how troubled and atypical such relations may be. 
Through the examination of scenarios found ‘on the edge’ of the principle, this 
Turkey’s membership to the eu. Can the Member States do as they please?’ (2007) 3 
EuConst 269–284.
145 See (n 25); see also Hillion (n 110) 215.
146 Van Elsuwege and Petrov (n 3) 697.
147 Hanf (n 3) 7.
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chapter has shown that good neighbourliness lies at the foundations of the 
process of European integration and constitutes in all cases a commitment to 
be met by all, simultaneously delimiting the process’s outer application. In 
particular, it appears that troubled neighbouring bilateral relations can be 
addressed within the broad framework of eu external relations based on man-
datory considerations of good neighbourliness,148 irrespective of whether the 
neighbouring country/territory is a direct neighbour of the Union itself.149 It 
also appears that the lack of reciprocity in neighbouring bilateral relations, 
whether intentional (in the case of Turkey) or not (in the case of the de facto 
division of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus) appears to enhance the role 
of the Union in the good neighbourliness process. This does not, however, 
appear to relieve the Member State and/or the third country concerned from 
their own commitment to good neighbourliness. Nevertheless, the nature and 
scope of the commitment may not be what was originally expected, as devel-
oped in this chapter. The example of Turkey in particular shows that it is the 
extent of the neighbouring country’s commitment towards good neighbour-
liness which should determine the outcome of its relations with the eu. 
Otherwise, the relationship between the eu and the third country concerned 
risks being exposed to serious problems in the event of a fundamental shift in 
the associated country’s attitude towards the eu, including with respect to a 
value, trust or a constitutional crisis in that third country, such as has already 
occurred within the eu.150 It would therefore appear that the underlying ques-
tion with respect to good neighbourliness relates to the role which Union val-
ues play in the European integration process, even from the outside, and the 
extent to which such values can be enforced through their outer application. 
As correctly noted by Hillion, ‘[i]n the neighbourhood, respect for the values 
of the Union becomes the aim of, rather than the pre-condition for eu 
engagement’,151 thus identifying the need for greater intellectual effort and 
policymaking in this field.
148 The eu appears to be bound (‘shall be bound’) to develop good relations with its neigh-
bours by virtue of Article 8(1) teu; see Hillion in Petrov and Van Elsuwege (n 3) 16–17.
149 It is clear that the de facto division of the island of Cyprus does not entail the consider-
ation of the occupied areas as a ‘neighbour’ of the Republic of Cyprus or of the Union, as 
developed in this chapter. It should be noted, however, that the European Commission’s 
aid programme for the Turkish Cypriot community falls under dg Enlargement, as there 
is clearly no better place to house it, thereby reinforcing this chapter’s conclusions; 
see <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/aid-programme-tcc/index_en.htm> last 
accessed 15 December 2014.
150 See (n 59).
151 Hillion (n 3) 20.
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